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Background: Measles cases continue to occur among susceptible individuals despite the elimination of endemic
measles transmission in the United States. Clustering of disease susceptibility can threaten herd immunity and
impact the likelihood of disease outbreaks in a highly vaccinated population. Previous studies have examined the
role of contact tracing to control infectious diseases among clustered populations, but have not explicitly modeled
the public health response using an agent-based model.
Methods: We developed an agent-based simulation model of measles transmission using the Framework for
Reconstructing Epidemiological Dynamics (FRED) and the Synthetic Population Database maintained by RTI
International. The simulation of measles transmission was based on interactions among individuals in different
places: households, schools, daycares, workplaces, and neighborhoods. The model simulated different levels of
immunity clustering, vaccination coverage, and contact investigations with delays caused by individuals’ behaviors
and/or the delay in a health department’s response. We examined the effects of these characteristics on the probability
of uncontrolled measles outbreaks and the outbreak size in 365 days after the introduction of one index case into a
synthetic population.
Results: We found that large measles outbreaks can be prevented with contact investigations and moderate contact
rates by having (1) a very high vaccination coverage (≥ 95%) with a moderate to low level of immunity clustering
(≤ 0.5) for individuals aged less than or equal to 18 years, or (2) a moderate vaccination coverage (85% or 90%)
with no immunity clustering for individuals (≤18 years of age), a short intervention delay, and a high probability
that a contact can be traced. Without contact investigations, measles outbreaks may be prevented by the highest
vaccination coverage with no immunity clustering for individuals (≤18 years of age) with moderate contact rates;
but for the highest contact rates, even the highest coverage with no immunity clustering for individuals
(≤18 years of age) cannot completely prevent measles outbreaks.
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Measles is a highly infectious, acute viral illness that
can cause severe pneumonia, diarrhea, encephalitis, as
well as death in rare cases [1]. Measles cases continue
to occur among susceptible individuals despite the
elimination of endemic measles transmission in the
United States as a result of importation [2,3]. The
introduction of one imported measles case into a group
or community with a large number of susceptible indi-
viduals can yield large outbreaks [4]. In California, the
number of measles cases associated with visits to one
of two Disney theme parks was 68 on January 23, 2015
(www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/health/california-measles-out
break/index.html). In 2013, an intentionally unvaccinated
adolescent returned to New York from London, United
Kingdom while infectious with measles. As a result, the
imported case led to the identification of 58 cases and six
generations of measles infection among members of an
orthodox Jewish community living in two neighborhoods
in Brooklyn [5], resulting in the largest outbreak of measles
in the United States since 1996 [5,6]. The outbreak was
propagated by a few extended families that either refused
the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine or de-
layed receipt of the vaccine. High population-level vaccin-
ation coverage outside of this community coupled with the
insular nature of the community itself likely prevented fur-
ther measles transmission [5]. Despite high vaccination
coverage of a population, clustering of disease susceptibility
due to personal beliefs and other exemptions to mandatory
childhood vaccination can threaten herd immunity and
impact the likelihood of disease outbreaks [7].
Previous researchers have used mathematical models
to explore these empirical observations. The measles
vaccination threshold to attain herd immunity in a
population is believed to be approximately 90%–95%,
but these estimates were based on models with relatively
simple assumptions about contacts among individuals in
the population, e.g., random mixing [8]. Mathematical
models have examined infectious disease dynamics over
specific contact networks [9] and household structure
[10,11], particularly preferential mixing among small
closely connected groups to show its effects on the
reproductive numbers of infectious diseases [11]. In gen-
eral, population-level disease dynamics are influenced by
heterogeneous contact patterns [12]. Furthermore, clus-
tering may decrease the size of epidemics, but also may
decrease the epidemic threshold, making it easier for a
disease to spread [13]. Furthermore, outbreaks can occur
even with very high vaccination rates as the clustering of
vaccination increases [8].
With each identified measles case, public health de-
partments investigate the close contacts of the case in
order to identify anyone who may have been exposed
while the case was infectious. If susceptible closecontacts are identified, contact tracing efforts can lead
to public health interventions (i.e., giving exposed con-
tacts post-exposure vaccine or post-exposure immune
globulin) with the hope of minimizing the chance of
disease development. In addition, exposed individuals
are asked to monitor their symptoms for at least one
incubation period, and report any symptoms to public
health authorities, should they develop symptoms con-
sistent with measles. However, people do not always
comply with public health interventions or recommen-
dations. Also, public health authorities cannot always
find identified contacts, or do not always reach suscep-
tible contacts soon enough in order for post-exposure
prophylaxis to be effective; contacts would be placed in
quarantine in these instances. With vaccination cover-
age in the community, clustering of susceptibility, indi-
vidual behaviors, and contacts occurring over networks
of individuals, one question that remains is under which
circumstances do contact tracing activities and the
associated interventions given by a local or state health
department help to control measles epidemics? The
purpose of our study was to identify the characteristics of
population vaccination coverage, clustering of susceptibil-
ity, individuals’ behaviors, and the public health response
that impact the occurrence of measles epidemics.
Methods
Ethics statement
The project received a determination of not being re-
search involving human subjects when reviewed by the
Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at the
California Department of Public Health.
Model structure
We developed an agent-based simulation model of mea-
sles transmission after the introduction of one index
case into a population in order to study the effects of
contact tracing and public health interventions on the
occurrence of measles epidemics. The agent-based simu-
lation model has two main components: (1) the agent-
based simulation model of measles transmission using the
Framework for Reconstructing Epidemiological Dynamics
(FRED) [14,15], and (2) a synthetic population of individ-
uals adapted from the Synthetic Population Database
maintained by RTI International [16]. In this section, we
describe the various features of our model: the natural
history of measles, the synthetic population, the contact
network and transmission assumptions, clusters of
immunity, contact investigations, public health inter-
ventions, and the analysis of the results. Briefly, all indi-
viduals in the synthetic population were in a social
network and were given characteristics consistent with
the U.S. Census and the California Department of
Finance population estimates (www.dof.ca.gov), and
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individuals in this network. The model simulated different
levels of vaccination coverage, different levels of immunity
clustering, and delays in contact investigations. We exam-
ined the effect of changes in the various features of the
model on changes in the number of secondary cases, the
total outbreak size (i.e., the total number of diagnosed
cases), and the probability of uncontrolled outbreak sce-
narios over one year (i.e., chains of transmission continu-
ing longer than one year).
Natural history of measles
The natural history of measles was modeled as follows:
an infected individual was assumed to be infectious for
approximately nine days (four days before rash onset
through four days after the onset of rash [1,17]) after a
latent period of approximately eight days [18]. A ten-day
symptomatic period [19-24] began 8 to 14 days after
exposure [25,26] with rash onset beginning 7 to 19 after
exposure [27]. An individual who recovered from an
infection was no longer susceptible to subsequent infec-
tion. In the agent-based model, we used a standard SEIR
model (susceptible-exposed/latent-infectious-recovered)
[28] to represent an individual’s health states.
Synthetic population
Our model incorporated a synthetic population gener-
ated from a Synthetic Population Database developed by
RTI International [16] that represented every individual
in a specific geographic region. The synthetic population
was generated based on the U.S. Census and the Califor-
nia Department of Finance population estimates, and
each individual had associated demographic information
(e.g., age, sex) and locations for social activity (e.g.,
household, neighborhood, and possibly school or work-
place). To reflect measles transmission among preschool-
aged children [29], we added daycares to the synthetic
population (using daycare data from the California Depart-
ment of Social Services’ Community Care Licensing Div-
ision: www.ccld.ca.gov) according to location information
for daycare-aged children. Further daycare details in the
synthetic population are given in the Additional file 1.
Contact network and transmission
The simulation of measles transmission was based on
interactions among individuals in different places:
households, schools, daycares, workplaces, and neigh-
borhoods. Depending on the assigned locations of social
activity based on the synthetic population data, each in-
dividual visited his or her household and neighborhood
on each simulated day. The individual could have visited
his/her school, daycare, or workplace if the individual
was a student, a daycare-aged child or employed, re-
spectively. In addition, the individual could interact withother individuals who shared the same activity locations
for the same simulated day.
For an infectious individual, the number of contacts
on a given day depends on the contact rate per day (the
time unit of simulation is one day) in each of the loca-
tions the infectious individual has visited, as well as the
probability of transmission per contact. The contact rate
per day depends on the type of place of the contact, as
shown in Table 1. We assume that, on a given day, a
child attending a daycare may have 3 to 20 random con-
tacts with other children who are in the same daycare;
similarly, a student attending a school may randomly
contact 3 to 20 schoolmates (base on the child-staff ratio
for daycares in California: www.daycare.com/california,
and the average class size in California public schools:
www.cde.ca.gov/ds/sd/dr/cefteachavgclssize.asp); a worker
may contact 0 to 7 co-workers (according to the RTI’s
synthetic population used by the model, 61.4% work-
places have the number of workers ≤7); each individual
may have 0.5 to 7 neighborhood contacts; each individ-
ual contacts each of his/her household members with a
probability ranging from 0.01 to 1. We assume that the
transmission probability per contact is very high, as
measles is a highly contagious disease [30].
Whenever an infective individual contacts another
individual, the chance that disease transmission will ac-
tually occur depends on the immunity level of the
contact. The immune status of each simulated individual
is a function, in part, of the age-specific vaccination
coverage and the efficacy of vaccine (see Section: Clus-
ters of immunity). Once the susceptible individual is in-
fected, the individual is infectious for approximately
nine days [1,17] starting the day after the latent period,
which is approximately eight days long [18]. The prob-
ability distributions of the numbers of days spent in the
latent period and infectious period are given in the
Additional file 1. For each transmission episode, data
about the episode (i.e., date, infector, infectee, and loca-
tion) are recorded by the simulation program, and this
transmission record is used in the simulations involving
contact tracing and public health interventions (see Sec-
tion: Contact investigation and public health intervention).
Measles transmission is initiated by introducing one
randomly selected index case, whose age is consistent
with the observed age distribution of measles cases in
California, into a highly vaccinated population; the
initialization of vaccination will be discussed in Section
Clusters of immunity. After the latent period, the index
case may transmit measles by contacting susceptible
individuals in different locations (household, neighbor-
hood, school, daycare, or workplace settings) on each
day of the infectious period. Each new infectious individ-
ual caused by the index case may then transmit measles
via the individual’s contact network during his or her
Table 1 Parameters
Parameter Initial value Lower Upper Interpretation Reference
V: vaccination coverage 0.95 0.85 1 vaccination coverage rate for individuals aged less than or equal to
18 years
[32-34]
Ω: immunity clustering 0.5 0 1 level of immunity clustering for individuals aged less than or equal
to 18 years in a household
Household contact probability 0.46 0.01 1 contact probability per day between any two household members
Neighborhood contact rate 3 person/day 0.5 7 contact rate per day in neighbourhood assume
Workplace contact rate 3 person/day 0 7 contact rate per day in workplace synthetic population
School contact rate 9 person/day 3 20 contact rate per day in school www.cde.ca.gov/ds/sd/dr/
cefteachavgclssize.asp
Daycare contact rate 9 person/day 3 20 contact rate per day in daycare www.daycare.com/california
Household transmission probability 0.99 0.99 0.99 transmission probability per contact in household [30]
Neighborhood transmission probability 0.99 0.99 0.99 transmission probability per contact in neighborhood [30]
Workplace transmission probability 0.99 0.99 0.99 transmission probability per contact in workplace [30]
School transmission probability 0.99 0.99 0.99 transmission probability per contact in school [30]
Daycare transmission probability 0.99 0.99 0.99 transmission probability per contact in daycare [30]
Vaccine efficacy 0.99 0.99 0.99 efficacy of two doses of vaccine for measles, mumps and rubella [35,36]
Trace probability 1 1 1 probability that an individual is traceable assume
Intervention delay 1 day 1 3 intervention delay for contacts of an index case (J. Zipprich, pers. commun.)
Contact tracing delay 1 day 1 3 delay for tracing a contact from an infectious case assume
Self report delay 2 day 1 6 delay between the first day of symptom of a case and the day the
case visits hospital
assume
Cooperation probability 1 1 1 probability that an individual is cooperative to accept public health
interventions
assume
Contact finding probability 1 0.7 1 probability that a contact of an infectious case can be traced assume
Post-exposure prophylactic vaccine efficacy 0.93 0.92 0.95 efficacy of post-exposure prophylactic vaccine for measles, mumps
and rubella
[35,36]
Post-exposure prophylactic immune globulin
efficacy
0.75 0.6 0.9 efficacy of post-exposure prophylactic immune globulin [60-62]
Home quarantine probability 0.97 0.9 1 probability that an individual who is recommended to stay home
until recovery will follow the recommendation
assume
Home stay probability 0.61 0 1 probability that a case decides (on each day of the symptomatic
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behavior during the symptomatic period, we assume that
the individual may decide to stay home with a specified
probability (ranging from 0 to 1, Table 1) on each day of
the symptomatic period until recovery.
To reflect the difference of social activities between
weekdays and weekends during the simulation, schools
and daycares are assumed to be closed on weekends.
Approximately 34% of workers are randomly chosen to
continue visiting their workplaces on weekends (based on
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics: www.bls.gov/
news.release/atus.nr0.htm) and the number of neighbor-
hood contacts per day on weekends is assumed to increase
by 50% [15].
Clusters of immunity
Despite high vaccination coverage, clustering of disease
susceptibility due to personal beliefs and other exemp-
tions to mandatory childhood vaccination can threaten
herd immunity and impact the likelihood of disease out-
breaks [7]. Salathe et al. [31] showed that the effect of
clustered susceptible individuals on disease outbreak
probabilities is strong when the vaccination coverage is
close to the level required to provide herd immunity
under the assumption of random mixing.
To model the clusters of susceptible children in a
highly vaccinated population (i.e., vaccination coverage
of two-dose of MMR was assumed to range between
95% to 99% (V) for children less than or equal to
18 years of age [32-34] and 92.4% to 97.9% for individ-
uals greater than 18 years of age [34]), we proceed as
follows. On one extreme, we simply assume random
vaccination of children; under this assumption, the vac-
cination status of each child is independent of the status
of all other children in the household; we denote the
coverage level by V. At the other extreme, we assume
that while the overall coverage is still V, all children in a
given household have the same vaccine status. In the
model, we interpolate between these two extremes, with
Ω = 0 representing random vaccination, and Ω = 1 denot-
ing completely positive assortative vaccine status. The
interpolation formula is given in the Additional file 1;
values ofΩ between 0 and 1 represent intermediate config-
urations between random vaccination and completely posi-
tive assortative vaccination of children. For each synthetic
household, we assign vaccination status to each household
member in this way to initialize the clusters of immunity
in the synthetic population with a given level of clustering,
Ω, (assuming that the efficacy of two doses of MMR vac-
cine is 99% [35,36], Table 1). The simulation of measles
transmission discussed in Section Contact network and
transmission is in a highly vaccinated and susceptibility-
cluster-specific population. Note that detailed age-specific
vaccine coverage data by household are not available.Contact investigation and public health intervention
For an identified case, the public health department
cannot know all the contacts of the case, and may not
be able to find every contact of the case. To simulate a
contact investigation, which may depend on the type of
place and the probability that the contacts of an infec-
tious case can be traced, we proceed as follows. First,
we assume that neighborhood contacts are not trace-
able. However, each of the contacts from the household,
school, daycare, and workplace settings can be identi-
fied by the infectious individual with some specified
probability. In addition, the identified contact can be
found by the public health department with a probabil-
ity ranging from 0.7 to 1 (in Table 1).
For an individual who is traced from an infectious case
by a contact investigation and receives a public health
intervention, several days may have elapsed since expos-
ure. For an infectious individual (either an index case or
a case not prevented by the contact tracing and public
health interventions) who visits the doctor and is con-
firmed as a measles case, there may have been several
days since the first day of symptoms. To simulate a con-
tact investigation, we assume there are three delays: (i)
the self report delay for an infectious individual, i.e., the
time between symptoms and diagnosis, (ii) the interven-
tion delay for contacts of an index case, and (iii) the
delay for finding a contact of an infectious case.
The self report delay for an infectious individual, i.e.,
the time between symptoms and diagnosis, is assumed
to be between one and six days (J. Zipprich, personal
communication, Table 1). The intervention delay for
contacts of an index case occurs if the infectious individ-
ual is an index case, there may be an additional one to
three days (intervention delay in Table 1), which is the
time between diagnosis and initiation of contact investi-
gation. If the infectious individual is not the index case
but instead is a subsequent case, we assume a further
round of contact investigation is inaugurated without
delay. The delay for finding a contact of an infectious case
occurs when the health department may need an add-
itional one to three days (contact tracing delay in Table 1)
to obtain the names of the infectious individual’s contacts,
trace them, test immunity and provide interventions.
For an individual who is traced by a contact investiga-
tion and receives a public health intervention, to simu-
late the delay from the first day of symptoms to the day
of receiving a public health intervention, we assume that
there are four scenarios:
 If the individual is an index case, the individual
receives the public health intervention at a time
ranging from 2 to 9 days after the first day of
symptoms, i.e., the sum of the self report delay and
the intervention delay;
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case but not an index case, the individual receives
the public health intervention at a time ranging
from 1 to 6 days (the self report delay) after the first
day of symptoms;
 If the individual is the infectee and the infector is an
index case, the individual receives the public health
intervention at a time ranging from 3 to 12 days
(the sum of three delays) after exposure;
 If the individual is the infectee and the infector is an
infectious but not an index case, the individual
receives the public health intervention at a time
ranging from 2 to 9 days (the sum of the self report
delay and the contact tracing delay) after exposure.
According to California Department of Public Health
[37], post-exposure prophylactic (PEP) MMR vaccine
may be given within 72 hours of exposure to persons ≥
6 months of age. Post-exposure prophylactic immune
globulin (IG) may be given within 6 days to exposed per-
sons of any age, though persons weighing less than
30 kg are prioritized. Home quarantine may be recom-
mended for exposed persons contacted seven days or
more from exposure. To simulate these three public
health interventions (PEP MMR, PEP IG and home
quarantine), we assume that one dose of PEP MMR is
given to an individual if it has not been more than three
days since the first day of exposure, the individual is
willing to accept PEP MMR, and the individual’s age is
greater than one year of age (using one year as the cutoff
is consistent with the public health department’s prac-
tice). We assume that PEP IG is given to an individual if
the individual’s age is ≤ 1 year and it has not been more
than six days since the first day of exposure, or if the in-
dividual’s age is >1 year, the individual is cooperative,
and it has been more than three days but not more than
six days since exposure. For an individual who is not
willing to accept PEP MMR or PEP IG, or if it has been
more than six days since the first day of exposure, we
assume that home quarantine is recommended.
Briefly, we simulated contact tracing activities and
public health interventions in four steps:
 Record all contacts. On each simulated day, the
simulation of measles transmission (Section Contact
network and transmission) records the information
for every contact, including the day when a
transmissible contact occurs, the infector (the
identity of the infectious individual), the infectee
(the identity of the individual contacted by the
infector), and the place (location/setting where
transmissible contact occurred).
 Trace contacts. When a case is diagnosed, the case
is interviewed and contacts elicited, which ismodeled by choosing a random sample of the true
contacts (excluding neighborhood contacts).
 Model public health interventions for elicited
contacts (including simulated time delays and loss to
follow-up). For each elicited contact, a random
Bernoulli trial is simulated with the contact finding
probability, and if the value is 1 (“success”), then a
random waiting time is added. The individual will
then be contacted for any interventions at that time
in the future (a random variable with an exponential
distribution). Only contacts within the last seven
days are elicited (by assumption).For an individual
who has been given any intervention in a previous
contact investigation, we do not schedule another
public health intervention within seven days since
the last intervention.
 Give public health interventions. First, not all
individuals cooperate with investigators; we,
therefore, generate a random Bernoulli trial with the
cooperation probability. If the result is 1 (“success”),
then we determine how much time has elapsed since
transmission for each individual with a scheduled
public health intervention. Either PEP MMR, PEP IG,
or a home quarantine recommendation is provided,
depending on the elapsed time.
Analysis
We analyzed the model in two steps. First, we selected a
Latin Hypercube sample [38,39] of parameters chosen
uniformly from the parameter ranges given in Table 1,
and simulated one year of transmission with contact
investigation and public health intervention. For each
parameter set, we introduced a single index case into the
synthetic population, and determined the total number
of new cases diagnosed during the year, and whether or
not active transmission was still occurring at the end of
the year. In many cases, transmission chains die out rap-
idly, while for other simulated scenarios, transmission
continues to occur. For each parameter set, we repli-
cated the epidemic 256 times (28, chosen arbitrarily, but
sufficient to ensure a 50% proportion has an estimated
standard deviation less than 5%). Thus, for each scenario
(parameter set), we determined (1) the number of sec-
ondary cases, (2) the outbreak size, and (3) the probabil-
ity that there were over 500 cases within the year
(uncontrolled transmission or “escape” probability). For
each replication, we also calculated the number of symp-
tomatic cases directly caused by the index case (allowing
the expected number of secondary cases per introduc-
tion to be estimated). For a given parameter set, the
simulation also monitored the outbreak size for each of
256 iterations; if the outbreak size was more than 500,
the iteration was classed as uncontrolled transmission.
The probability of uncontrolled transmission for each
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leading to uncontrolled transmission, divided by the
total number of introductions (256 in each case). Sec-
ond, we plotted the results after one year of simulated
measles transmission with contact investigations and
public health interventions for selected parameter sets.
Results
Sensitivity analysis
To determine which parameters were the most import-
ant in determining the number of secondary cases, the
outbreak size, and the probability of uncontrolled out-
break in a one year of measles transmission, we selected
a Latin Hypercube sample of 1024 different parameter
sets from the parameter ranges indicated in Table 1.
From each, the number of secondary cases, the number
of outbreak size, and the probability of uncontrolled
measles outbreaks (over one year) were computed from
256 replications. For definiteness, we chose Humboldt
County in California (population size 118,261). The
simulation was started by introducing one index case
who was randomly selected according to the observed
age distribution of measles cases in California. We then
computed the partial rank correlation coefficient (PRCC)
[40,41] between each input parameter and each of three
simulation outcomes (the number of secondary cases,
the total outbreak size and the probability of uncon-
trolled measles outbreaks in 365 days). When the PRCC
is close to zero, the value of the parameter has little rela-
tion to the simulation output; when the PRCC is close
to +1 or −1, the value of the parameter is highly import-
ant in determining the simulation output.Table 2 PRCC of parameters with secondary cases, outbreak s
365 days
Name Secondar
V: vaccination coverage −0.4464
Ω. : immunity clustering 0.3364
Household contact probability −0.09997
Neighborhood contact rate 0.8834
Workplace contact rate 0.07722
School contact rate 0.1087
Intervention delay 0.1884
Contact tracing delay 0.06729
Self report delay 0.4406
Contact finding probability −0.135
Post-exposure prophylactic vaccine efficacy −0.005373
Post-exposure prophylactic immune globulin efficacy −0.09336
Home quarantine probability −0.0598
Home stay probability −0.9049
Daycare contact rate 0.01553Scenario analysis
We chose 4 parameters (PRCC ≥ 0.1, in Table 2), which
are (1) vaccination coverage, (2) level of immunity clus-
tering (Ω), (3) intervention delay, and (4) contact finding
probability to explore factors which contribute to the
successful control of measles (i.e., the probability of
uncontrolled measles outbreak). In this section, we
examine (1) the combinations of vaccination coverage
and the level of immunity clustering, (2) the combina-
tions of intervention delay and contact finding probabil-
ity based on different levels of immunity clustering and
vaccination coverage, (3) the combinations of vaccin-
ation coverage and contact rates in the neighborhood,
and (4) the combinations of vaccination coverage and
contact rates in all places. We report the probability of
escape, or the mean outbreak size (when no scenarios
showed a total number of cases exceeding 500 by one
year after measles introduction). Due to the critical
threshold level for the fraction of susceptible individuals
below which introduction of infections can only lead to
minor outbreaks and above which minor and major out-
breaks can occur [42], we present the probability of
uncontrolled outbreaks for scenarios in which minor
and major outbreaks occurred and total outbreak size
for scenarios that only led to minor outbreaks [43].
Effects of vaccination coverage and the level of immunity
clustering
For combinations of vaccination coverage ranging from
0.8 to 1 and the level of immunity clustering ranging
from 0 to 1 (all other parameter values are shown in
Table 1), the results are shown in Figure 1. When atize and probability of uncontrolled measles outbreak in

















































Figure 1 Effects of vaccination coverage and clustering of immunity on the control of measles epidemics. For each combination of vaccination
coverage V and the level of immunity clustering Ω (all other parameters’ values are shown in Table 1), we ran 256 iterations to obtain the outbreak size
and the uncontrolled outbreak probability in 365 simulated days. The combinations with which the simulated uncontrolled outbreak probabilities >0
are represented by red cells and scaled from light red (lower uncontrolled outbreak probability) to dark red (higher uncontrolled outbreak probability);
the values of simulated uncontrolled outbreak probabilities are shown in red cells. The combinations without uncontrolled outbreaks (the simulated
uncontrolled outbreak probabilities =0) are shown by blue cells and scaled from light blue (higher outbreak size) to dark blue (lower outbreak
size); the values of simulated outbreak sizes are shown in blue cells. The frontiers between adjacent combinations with and without uncontrolled
outbreaks are shown by the black lines. These simulations suggest that the vaccination coverage is important in the control of measles epidemics
(the higher vaccination coverage, the lower the probability of uncontrolled measles outbreaks and the smaller outbreak size); for a given vaccination
coverage, a lower level of immunity clustering (i.e., the lower the chance of unvaccinated individuals clustered together in a household) may have
better control of measles epidemics.
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the result is shown in red; when there were no escape
scenarios, the mean outbreak size is shown in blue; the
border between an escape scenario and a no escape sce-
nario is shown in black. Figure 1 shows that the vaccin-
ation coverage required to prevent measles outbreaks
was approximately 95% for all levels of immunity clus-
tering. For the scenario with the lowest level of immun-
ity clustering, the threshold vaccination coverage was
80%. For the combinations with which there were no
measles outbreaks, Figure 1 also shows that the outbreak
size dramatically decreased with an increase in vaccin-
ation coverage for a given level of immunity clustering.
These simulations simply illustrate the importance of
high vaccination coverage and that clustering of unvac-
cinated individuals is unfavorable for disease control.The results assumed the contact rates, self-report delays,
intervention delays for contacts of the index case, and
the probability that a contact can be traced were con-
stant (Table 1).
Effects of intervention delay and contact finding
probability based on different levels of immunity
clustering and vaccination coverage
To expand further on the relationship between vaccin-
ation coverage and immunity clustering and their role in
the control of measles outbreaks, we examined the influ-
ence of two parameters related to contact investigations,
intervention delay for contacts of an index case and the
contact finding probability, on the occurrence of measles
outbreaks. In Figure 2, we present the results of our



























































































































































Figure 2 Effects of intervention delays and the contact finding probability on the control of measles epidemics. We simulated the main outcomes for
each combination of the intervention delay for contacts of the index case and the contact finding probability under 9 combinations (A, B, C, D, E, F, G,
H and I) of vaccination coverage (V= 0.85, 0.9 and 0.95) and the level of immunity clustering (Ω=0, 0.5 and 1). Cells in red indicate the combinations
with which the simulations had uncontrolled outbreaks with the uncontrolled outbreak probabilities ranging from low to high. Cells in light blue show
the combinations without uncontrolled outbreaks but with higher outbreak sizes than the combinations without uncontrolled outbreaks represented
by dark blue cells. The frontiers between adjacent combinations with and without uncontrolled outbreaks are shown by the black lines. The results in
(A), (B) and (C) suggest that increasing vaccination coverage levels and the contact finding probability while reducing intervention delays may reduce
the uncontrolled outbreak probability. However, measles outbreaks may not be prevented with the highest level of immunity clustering. The results in
(D), (E) and (F) suggest that scenarios with a lower level of immunity clustering, increasing vaccination coverage and contact finding probability, and
reducing intervention delays have smaller uncontrolled outbreak probabilities than the highest level of immunity clustering (shown in Figures 2(A), (B)
and (C)), and 95% of vaccination may be enough to prevent measles outbreak which is consistent with the result shown in Figure 1 (the cell with
V=95% and Ω=0.5); when V=90%, measles outbreaks may be prevented by the combinations of low intervention delays and a high contact finding
probability. The results in (G), (H) and (I) suggest that with the lowest level of immunity clustering, increasing vaccination coverage may dramatically
reduce measles outbreaks.
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Liu et al. BMC Public Health  (2015) 15:447 Page 10 of 160.90, and 0.95 in the three columns) and three levels of
immunity clustering (Ω=0, 0.5, and 1.0 in the three
rows). For each coverage-clustering combination, we
show the results of our simulations across values of the
contact finding probability (x-axis ranging from 0.50 to
1.0) and the intervention delay for contacts of the index
case (y-axis ranging from 1 to 7 days). In the setting with
the lowest vaccination coverage and the highest level of
immunity clustering (V=0.85 and Ω=1.0, Figure 2(A)),
we found that escape scenarios could occur for all values
of the intervention delay and the contact finding prob-
ability, and thus report the probability of escape scenar-
ios denoted in red. In the setting with the highest
vaccination coverage and the lowest level of immunity
clustering (V=0.95 and Ω=0.0, Figure 2(I)), we obtained
no uncontrolled outbreaks, and report the total outbreak
size for all values of the intervention delay and the con-
tact finding probability (shown in blue). The settings
where the levels of the intervention delay and the
contact finding probability become important were in
Figure 2(C), (E), and (G), when the coverage-clustering
combinations were either both high (Figure 2(C)), both
moderate (Figure 2(E)), or both low (Figure 2(G)). For
these three settings, the level of intervention delay for
contacts of the index case and the probability a contact
can be found determines whether we have controlled or
uncontrolled measles outbreaks. Even with stochastic
simulation error, higher contact finding probabilities
with lower intervention delays lead to controlled measles
outbreaks.
However, Figure 2 does not show the effects of the
speed of contact investigation on the uncontrolled prob-
ability and the outbreak size. To study the effects of the
speed of contact investigations, we varied the self report
delay, the intervention delay and the contact tracing
delay and found that the uncontrolled outbreak prob-
abilities and the outbreak sizes were reduced by increas-
ing the speed of contact investigation (as shown in
Table 3). In general, the speed of contact investigations









0.215 749.4 6 7
0.191 636 6 3
0.098 152 4 2
0 2.8 1 1
0.152 371.6 6 7
0.148 344.8 6 3
0.054 69.8 4 2
0 3.3 1 1Effects of vaccination coverage and contact rate in
neighborhood
The PRCC value for the neighborhood contact rate
(in Table 2) indicates that the transmission in the neigh-
borhood setting is highly important in determining the
probability of uncontrolled measles outbreaks and the
total outbreak size because of the assumption that con-
tact tracing does not happen in the neighborhood (i.e.,
people are not likely to identify the people they encoun-
ter in the neighborhood setting). We used the parame-
ters’ values in Table 1 and combinations of vaccination
coverage (ranging from 0 to 1) and the neighborhood
contact rate (ranging from 1 to 7) to study their effects
on the uncontrolled measles outbreak probability and
total outbreak size. The simulation for each combination
was run under three scenarios: (1) without contact
investigation, (2) with contact investigation and little
intervention delay for contacts of the index case, and (3)
with contact investigation and more intervention delay
for contacts of the index case. For the scenario without
contact investigation, Figure 3(A) shows that more
neighborhood contacts caused more outbreaks; increas-
ing vaccination coverage could reduce the number of
measles cases, but even with the highest vaccination
coverage (100%), it still could not completely prevent
the measles outbreak for high contact rates in neighbor-
hood. For the scenario with contact investigation and
less intervention delay for contacts of the index case, as
shown Figure 3(B), with lower contact rates in the
neighborhood, measles could be controlled even with
80% vaccination coverage; and 100% of vaccination
coverage could prevent measles outbreaks for all contact
rates in the neighborhood. For the scenario with contact
investigations but with more intervention delays for con-
tacts of the index case, Figure 3(C) shows that measles
outbreaks were prevented by the combinations of low
contact rates in the neighborhood with all vaccination
coverage levels, and the combinations of the highest
vaccination coverage level with all contact rates in neigh-














A: without contact investigation









0.34 0.32 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.051 3.3 1.5
0.43 0.44 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.14 0.0078 1.7
0.52 0.53 0.48 0.44 0.36 0.22 0.051 2.4
0.63 0.63 0.54 0.5 0.38 0.29 0.11 3.8
0.68 0.64 0.59 0.5
0.7 0.7 0.61 0.57 0.49 0.37 0.21 6.3
0.75 0.72 0.68 0.61 0.54 0.44 0.29 0.0039
0.82 0.77 0.68 0.62 0.59 0.41 0.29 0.016
0.46 0.32 0.14 4.9
B: with contact investigation and less intervention delay









1.7 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1
3.2 2.2 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3
0.0039 6.4 5.4 3.8 2.7 2.1 2.1 1.5
0.14 0.09 0.059 0.0078 6.6 2.8 2.1 1.9
0.29 0.18 0.13 0.055
0.38 0.36 0.21 0.15 0.055 0.0039 4.2 2.4
0.46 0.39 0.3 0.24 0.09 0.035 0.0039 2.9
0.56 0.41 0.36 0.27 0.21 0.074 0.0039 2.7
0.012 9.6 3.6 1.7
C: with contact investigation and more intervention delay









1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
4.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3
0.023 14 4.4 5.9 3.5 2.7 1.9 1.6
0.21 0.14 0.07 0.031 5.4 3.2 3.5 1.7
0.33 0.21 0.15 0.1
0.4 0.36 0.22 0.18 0.09 0.02 7.1 2.2
0.52 0.41 0.34 0.26 0.14 0.07 0.0078 3.3
0.58 0.42 0.4 0.28 0.22 0.1 0.012 5.9

















Figure 3 Effects of vaccination coverage and the contact rate in neighborhoods on the control of measles epidemics. We used the parameters’
values in Table 1 and combinations of vaccination coverage and contact rates in the neighborhood, and ran 256 iterations for each combination
to simulate the uncontrolled outbreak probability and the outbreak size in 365 days under three scenarios: (A) without contact investigations, (B)
with contact investigations and less intervention delay for contacts of the index case, and (C) with contact investigations and more intervention
delay for contacts of the index case. For each of the scenarios A, B, and C, red cells show the combinations with uncontrolled outbreaks (the
simulated uncontrolled outbreak probabilities >0; light red cells indicate combinations with lower uncontrolled outbreak probabilities; dark red
cells indicate combinations with higher uncontrolled outbreak probabilities); and blue cells represent the simulated outbreak sizes of the combinations
without uncontrolled outbreaks (the simulated uncontrolled outbreak probabilities =0), and scale the outbreak sizes from low (dark blue) to high (light
blue). The frontiers between adjacent combinations with and without uncontrolled outbreaks are shown by the black lines. These simulations suggest:
contact investigation plays an important role in preventing measles uncontrolled outbreaks and reducing the total outbreak size; with contact
investigations, reducing the contact rates in the neighborhood may lower the vaccination coverage required to prevent uncontrolled measles
outbreaks; with contact investigations and the highest vaccination coverage, measles outbreaks may be prevented even with very high contact
rates in the neighborhood; less intervention delays for contacts of the index case may help contact investigations reduce the probability of
uncontrolled measles outbreaks and the total outbreak size.
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Liu et al. BMC Public Health  (2015) 15:447 Page 12 of 16and outbreak sizes were higher than those of the scenario
with contact investigation and less intervention delays for
contacts of the index case, i.e., there is less of a chance for
a traced contact to receive PEP MMR or PEP IG with
more intervention delays. By comparing the same combi-
nations of the scenario without contact investigation in
Figure 3(A), the probabilities of uncontrolled outbreaks
and the outbreak sizes among the other two scenarios in
Figures 3(B) and (C) were dramatically reduced by contact
investigations. These simulations suggest: (1) contact in-
vestigation plays an important role in preventing measles
outbreaks and reducing the outbreak size; (2) with contact
investigations, reducing the contact rate in the neighbor-
hood may lower the vaccination coverage required to pre-
vent measles outbreaks; (3) with contact investigation and
the highest vaccination coverage, measles outbreaks may
be prevented even with very high contact rates in neigh-
borhood; and (4) less intervention delays for contacts of
the index case may help contact investigations reduce the
probability of uncontrolled measles outbreaks and the out-
break size.
Effects of vaccination coverage and contact rates in all
places
To study further the effects of contact rates in all places
and vaccination coverage on the uncontrolled measles
outbreak probability and outbreak size, we used a par-
ameter ranging from 0 and 1 to scale contact rates in
school, daycare, workplace, household and neighborhood
settings (i.e., when the scale parameter is 0, each place
has the lowest contact rate; when the scale parameter is
1, each place has the highest contact rate; when the scale
parameter is between 0 and 1, the contact rate in each
place is between its lower and upper bounds shown in
Table 1). Similarly, for each combination of vaccination
coverage (ranging from 0 to 1) and the scale parameter
(ranging from 0 to 1), we ran the simulations under
three scenarios (all other the parameters’ values are
shown in Table 1): (1) without contact investigation, (2)
with contact investigation and less intervention delay for
contacts of the index case, and (3) with contact investi-
gation and more intervention delay for contacts of the
index case. For the scenario without contact investiga-
tion, Figure 4(A) shows that the more contact rates in
all places the more outbreaks and the higher number of
outbreak sizes; increasing vaccination coverage could re-
duce the number of measles cases; when scale of contact
rates in all places was very high, even the highest vaccin-
ation coverage (100%) could not completely prevent the
measles outbreak; however, for the lowest scale of con-
tact rates, even 80% of vaccination could prevent mea-
sles outbreak. For the scenario with contact investigation
and less intervention delay for contacts of the index
case, Figure 4(B) shows that with lower scale of contactrates in all places, measles could be controlled even with
80% of vaccination coverage; and 100% of vaccination
coverage could prevent measles outbreak for all scales of
contact rates in all places. For the scenario with contact
investigations but with more intervention delays among
contacts of the index case, Figure 4(C) shows that mea-
sles outbreaks were prevented by the combinations of
low contact rates in all places and all vaccination cover-
age levels, and the combinations of the highest vaccin-
ation coverage and all contact rates in all places; most of
the uncontrolled outbreak probabilities and the outbreak
sizes were higher than those of the scenario with contact
investigations and less intervention delays for contacts
of the index case (in Figure 4(B)) because the effects of
intervention delays. By comparing this to the same com-
binations of the scenario without contact investigations
in Figure 4(A), the probabilities of an uncontrolled out-
break and the outbreak sizes in the other two scenarios
in Figures 4(B) and (C) were dramatically reduced by the
contact investigations. These simulations suggest: (1)
contact investigations play an important role in prevent-
ing measles outbreaks and reducing the total outbreak
sizes; (2) without contact investigations but with the
lowest scale of contact rates in all places, even an 80%
vaccination coverage may prevent measles outbreaks; (3)
with contact investigations, reducing the contact rates in
all places may lower the vaccination coverage required
to prevent measles outbreaks; (4) with contact investiga-
tions and the highest vaccination coverage level, measles
outbreaks may be prevented even with very high contact
rates in all places; (5) less intervention delays for con-
tacts of the index case may help contact investigations
reduce the number of measles cases.
Discussion and conclusion
We constructed a stochastic agent-based model to ex-
plore the impact of various characteristics (population
vaccination coverage, clustering of immunity, individual
behavior, and the public health response) on the occur-
rence of measles epidemics. Our analysis focused on
contact investigations and their associated interventions
(post-exposure prophylaxis) to control and prevent mea-
sles transmission. Our results confirm previous observa-
tions that vaccination coverage and clustering of immunity
are important characteristics that influence the ability to
control a measles epidemic. We were able to expand on
our understanding of vaccination coverage and clustering
by demonstrating that the prevention of uncontrolled
measles outbreaks may depend on the level of interven-
tion delays and the probability of finding a contact when
vaccination coverage is high with a low to moderate
level of clustering. In a highly immunity-clustered
population, the prevention of uncontrolled measles out-
breaks may only be possible with high vaccination
A: without contact investigation
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0.7 0.66 0.6 0.51
0.71 0.75 0.68 0.61 0.55 0.38 0.23 10
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0.21 0.13 0.082 0.0078 9.3 3.5 3.3 1.8
0.34 0.23 0.2 0.15
0.45 0.36 0.3 0.17 0.086 0.047 9.8 2.2
0.51 0.45 0.33 0.32 0.14 0.074 14 3.1
0.62 0.48 0.44 0.33 0.29 0.1 0.035 5.6



















Figure 4 Effects of vaccination coverage and contact rates in all places on the control of measles epidemics. We used a scale parameter ranging
from 0 to 1 to scale contact rates in school, daycare, workplace, household and neighborhood. For each combination of vaccination coverage V
and the scale of all contact rates, the main outcomes were obtained by running the simulation for each of three scenarios: (A) without contact
investigations, (B) with contact investigations and less intervention delays for contacts of the index case, and (C) with contact investigations and
more intervention delays for contacts of the index case. For scenarios A, B, and C, red cells show the combinations with uncontrolled outbreaks
and blue cells represent the simulated outbreak sizes of the combinations without uncontrolled outbreaks. The values of simulated uncontrolled
outbreak probabilities are shown with blue numbers in red cells; the values of simulated outbreak sizes are shown with red numbers in blue cells.
The frontiers between adjacent combinations with and without uncontrolled outbreaks are shown by the black lines. These simulations suggest:
(1) contact investigations play an important role in preventing uncontrolled measles outbreaks and reducing the total outbreak size; (2) without
contact investigations but with the lowest scale of contact rates in all places, even an 80% vaccination coverage may prevent uncontrolled measles
outbreaks; (3) with contact investigations, reducing the contact rates in all settings may lower the vaccination coverage required to prevent uncontrolled
measles outbreaks; (4) with contact investigations and the highest vaccination coverage level, uncontrolled measles outbreaks may be prevented even
with very high contact rates in all settings; (5) less intervention delay for contacts of the index case may help contact investigations reduce the number
of measles cases.
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thermore, we showed that contact rates are important
drivers of transmission, especially neighborhood contact
rates given our assumptions about our ability to identify
contacted individuals in the neighborhood setting. Re-
ducing contact rates in all settings may lower the vac-
cination coverage level required to prevent measles
outbreaks in the presence of contact investigations and
their associated interventions. Overall, the results dem-
onstrated the importance of contact tracing activities to
prevent uncontrolled measles outbreaks or reduce the
total outbreak size.
Previous mathematical epidemiology studies have
examined the factors that are needed to sustain measles
transmission in communities [44-46], including critical
community size [47-49] and herd immunity [50,51]. In
addition, the effects of contact patterns across network
structures, including clustered and complex networks,
have also been elucidated using mathematical models in
order to design effective control strategies [8,9,13,52-55].
While there have been studies that have examined the
role of contact tracing to control infectious diseases
among clustered populations [56-58], none have mod-
eled the public health response using an agent-based
model as we have done in this study. The agent-based
model created using an open-source software system
(FRED) allows refinements to the model to be made for
further explorations of the effects of the public health
response, individual behaviors, population vaccination
coverage, and network structures on the ability to con-
trol and prevent measles outbreaks.
However, the study is subject to several limitations.
First, we do not have a lot of empirical evidence for
many of the behavior-related parameters in our model.
We obtained, where possible, expert opinion and/or
published estimates from the literature to inform our
parameter values. We incorporated a broad range of
values for the behavioral-related parameters in order to
explore the wide range of outcomes and conducted a
sensitivity analysis of the simulation results. Second, we
maintained a balance between core individual behaviors
and public health response behaviors in our model with
specific nuanced scenarios or possibilities. For example,
we understand that children ages 6 months to 11 months
can be given one dose of MMR vaccine instead of intra-
muscular IG if it is given within 72 hours of exposure so
long as the child is vaccinated again after 12 months of
age; our stochastic agent-based model does not allow for
this possibility with this age group. Third, we only con-
sidered vaccination clustering status among children less
than 18 years of age. Clustering among children occur
because parents make decisions for their children re-
garding vaccination. However, there are little data on
vaccination clustering among adults. Finally, the contactnetwork of this model did not include the healthcare set-
tings where measles cases interact with healthcare
workers and healthcare workers who become cases and
work while infectious may have a large number of
contacts.
Our results support the use of contact investigations
in the control and prevention of measles epidemics; the
results elucidate the circumstances in which control is
possible for various levels of vaccination coverage and
clustering of susceptibility among households, and the
simulation results are consistent with the findings in
[59] in which the authors found that minimal changes in
the level of aggregation of unvaccinated individuals can
lead to sustained transmission in highly vaccinated
populations.
We used an agent-based model to simulate measles
transmission after the introduction of one index case
into a population and study the effects of the level of im-
munity clustering, vaccination coverage, contact rates,
contact tracing and public health interventions on the
uncontrolled measles outbreak probability and the total
outbreak size in 365 days. The simulated results show
that the level of immunity clustering, vaccination coverage
and contact investigation are important in the prevention
of measles outbreaks. With contact investigations and
moderate contact rates in all places, measles outbreaks
can be prevented by (1) a very high vaccination coverage
(≥95%) with a moderate to low level of immunity cluster-
ing (≤0.5), or (2) a moderate vaccination coverage (85% or
90%) with the lowest level of immunity clustering and a
short intervention delay for contacts of the index case and
a high probability that a contact can be traced. Without
contact investigations, measles outbreaks may be pre-
vented by the highest vaccination coverage with the lowest
level of immunity clustering and moderate contact rates.
For the highest contact rates in all places, even the lowest
level of immunity clustering with the highest vaccination
coverage cannot completely prevent measles outbreaks.
Two directions for future work include using this model
(with calibration) to study: (1) the effects of public health
intervention strategies on the control and prevention of
measles epidemics, and (2) the effects of clustering of sus-
ceptibility in school and daycare settings on vaccination
coverage required to prevent measles outbreaks.Additional file
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